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Abstract
An income trust is an investment vehicle that distributes cash generated by a set of operating
assets in a tax-efﬁcient manner. The market capitalization of income trusts has grown rapidly over
the past two years, reaching $45 billion at year-end 2002. The sharp rise of income trust
valuations, the large supply of new issues, and the complexity of their legal structure have
increased scrutiny of this asset class. Because retail investors are the principal owners of income
trusts, the author explores whether the cash returns from income trusts are in line with the risks.
The structure and valuation of a typical income trust are outlined. The beneﬁts of income trusts
and the issues related to investment are elaborated, focusing on legal and regulatory issues,
corporate governance, operational issues, and market issues.
JEL classiﬁcation: G12, G3
Bank classiﬁcation: Financial markets
Résumé
Les ﬁducies de revenu sont des instruments de placement qui versent les gains produits par un
portefeuille d’actifs d’exploitation, et ce, en réduisant l’incidence de l’impôt des sociétés. La
capitalisation boursière de ces ﬁducies s’est accrue rapidement au cours des deux dernières
années, atteignant 45 milliards de dollars à la ﬁn de 2002. La forte hausse de leur valeur,
l’abondance des nouvelles émissions et la complexité de leur structure juridique ont eu pour effet
de diriger davantage l’attention sur cette catégorie d’actif. Dans son étude, l’auteur cherche à
déterminer si les montants versés aux détenteurs de parts, dont la majorité sont des particuliers,
sont proportionnels aux risques. Il donne également un aperçu de la structure et du mode
d’évaluation d’une ﬁducie de revenu type. Enﬁn, il décrit les avantages qu’offrent ces instruments
de même que les questions qu’ils soulèvent sur les plans juridique et réglementaire et sur ceux de
la gouvernance, des opérations et du marché.
Classiﬁcation JEL : G12, G3
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Marchés ﬁnanciers1
1. Introduction
Income trusts had a market capitalization of $45 billion at year-end 2002, a dramatic increase
from the $29.5 billion at year-end 2001 and the $2 billion at year-end 1994 (Figure 1). The sharp
rise of income trust valuations and the large supply of new issues have increased scrutiny of the
valuation of this asset class. Given the complexity of income trust structures, analysts speculate
that retail investors may not understand all the issues raised by this type of investment. This paper
reviews the key characteristics of income trusts, and outlines a number of issues related to their
legal structure, management, and valuation.
An income trust is an investment vehicle that pays out substantially all of the cash ﬂows generated
from relatively mature, revenue-producing assets in a tax-efﬁcient manner. This structure allows
the owners of a business to sell off assets at a higher valuation than when the assets are held in a
corporate structure. This higher valuation is driven by the high demand for income trust units and
the tax savings generated by this structure, which reduces or eliminates corporate tax for the
operating company. Investors in an income trust therefore receive a higher level of cash
distribution than is possible when the same assets are held by a corporation. Investors have earned
high total returns over the past year from income trusts, which are eligible for a registered
retirement savings plan (RRSP), pension accounts, and other non-taxable accounts. The growth of
this asset class has also beneﬁted the Canadian securities industry by bolstering earnings during a
period of weakness in other investment-banking businesses.
The Bank of Canada’s principal interest in the income trust sector concerns the efﬁcient
functioning and health of Canada’s ﬁnancial system. Capital markets form a key part of Canada’s
ﬁnancial system, and make an important contribution to the welfare of Canadians. This paper
provides background information on an important sector of Canadian capital markets, to foster an
informed discussion about income trusts both within the Bank and with other interested parties.
Section 2 highlights the phenomenal growth of this asset class over the past two years. Section 3
describes how an income trust is structured. Section 4 discusses the valuation of income trusts.
Section 5 reviews the beneﬁts and the issues to consider when investing in income trusts. Section
6 concludes with a discussion of the implications of income trusts for the efﬁciency and health of
Canada’s ﬁnancial system.2
2. Growth of the Income Trust Sector
An income trust is a special-purpose entity that sells equity to the public (“unitholders”) in the
form of units and uses the proceeds to purchase an operating company that holds a set of income-
generating assets. Legally, income trusts are a subset of the broader category of “mutual fund
trusts” within the meaning of the Income Tax Act (Canada).1 The term income trust can be used
broadly to cover a variety of businesses and models, or used narrowly to refer to a segment of this
asset class. In this paper, income trusts refer to royalty trusts, real estate investment trusts
(“REITs”), and trusts based on a variety of businesses (also called hybrid trusts or business
income trusts), but they exclude limited partnerships.2 In principle, an income trust owns mature
assets that require little ongoing capital expenditure, face little competition, and provide a long-
term stream of cash ﬂows. Examples of such assets are natural gas processing and distribution,
electrical power generation, mining, and warehouse facilities. In practice, a wide variety of
businesses have been securitized through income trusts, such as restaurants, consumer product
companies, manufacturing businesses, and telecommunications assets.3 Table 1 gives a
breakdown of income trusts by business sector.
1. Subsection132(6)oftheIncomeTaxAct(Canada)setsoutthecriteriaforqualifyingasamutualfund
trust. Mutual fund trusts may be open-ended or closed-ended. For more details, seeCIBC (2003),
Hayward(2002), and TD Newcrest (2002).
2. Surprisingly, there is no consensus on the number of income trusts outstanding, with ﬁgures reported
from 100 to 200. This confusion may result from a lack of consistency inthe use of the term income
trust, with some ﬁgures including oil and royalty trusts and REITs. See BMO Nesbitt Burns (2003),
CIBC (2003), TD Newcrest (2002), and National Bank Financial (2003).
3. Income trusts have been created for bleach processing, cheque printing, coffee decaffeination, gas
stations, heating oil, ice, newspapers, peat moss, pet food, pulp, and waste disposal.3
Income trusts, having a total market capitalization of $45 billion by year-end 2002, represented
about 6 per cent of the stock market capitalization of the Toronto Stock Exchange (CIBC 2003).
Income trusts are not included in the Standard and Poor’s/Toronto Stock Exchange (S&P/TSX)
Composite Index, but would rank eighth among the subindexes based on their market
capitalization (Scotia Capital 2002). In comparison, the Canadian corporate bond market had a
market capitalization of approximately $837 billion at year-end 2002, of which the high-yield
market was around $5 billion.
The phenomenal growth of income trusts has been driven by the appreciation of outstanding
income trust values, and the issuance of units through initial public offerings (IPOs) and
subsequent sales by existing income trusts. First, income trusts outperformed both equity and
government bonds in 2002, with the BMO Nesbitt Burns Trust Composite posting a total return of
13.7 per cent in 2002. This return compares with -12.4 per cent for the S&P/TSX Composite
Index and 10.8 per cent for 10-year Canada bonds (Table 2). Note that the total return of the BMO
Nesbitt Burns Trust Composite hides a considerable amount of volatility in this asset class, as
income trusts underperformed the overall equity market in the fourth quarter of 2002.
Table 1: Income Trusts by Business Sector
Business sector Number of
trusts
Per cent share by market
capitalization
Consumer and manufacturing businesses 44 31
Real Estate/REITs 16 22
Oil and gas 15 27
Power generation 8 11
Other resource-based 4 9
           Total 87 100
Source: Scotia Capital (2002)4
Second, sales of units by income trusts totalled $9.4 billion in 2002. IPOs of income trust units
dominated the market for new equity issues, with 36 income trusts totalling $5.1 billion being
offered to the public, representing 86 per cent of the value of Canadian IPOs last year. Existing
income trusts sold an additional $4.3 billion of units in 56 offerings.4 Figure 2 shows total income
trust issuance by quarter, including the sharp rise in the number of offerings beginning in the
fourth quarter of 2001. Income trusts have represented a rising share of equity issuance over the
past two years, accounting for approximately 40 per cent of issuance on the TSX and the TSX
Venture Exchange (Table 3 and Figure 3). According to data collected by the Investment Dealers
Association of Canada (IDA), the average size of an equity offering by an income trust in 2002
was $100 million, signiﬁcantly larger than the average equity offering of $6.8 million (Table 3).5
The major investors in this asset class are retail investors, who represent, on average, two-thirds of
the purchases of income trust IPOs in 2002 (Scotia Capital 2002).
Table 2: Total Return in 2002
Index Per cent
BMO Nesbitt Burns Trust Composite 13.7
S&P/TSX Composite -12.4
10-year Canada bonds 10.8
Source: BMO Nesbitt Burns (2003)
4. AnexistingincometrustisonethathadpreviouslygonepublicthroughanIPO.Becausemostincome
trusts are open-ended, an existing income trust can sell additional units to the public to raise new
capital.Thisnewcapitalcanbeusedtopurchasenewassets,ortoreplenishequitycapitalthathasbeen
paid out by the income trust.
5. This size difference may be due to the development of this sector, with the creation of new income
trusts driving growth. Once the income trust sector matures, the average size can be expected to
decline.5
Table 3: Annual Canadian Equity Issuance, 1996–2002
















1996 4.3 30 142.1 21.2 2,774 7.6 17
1997 10.3 70 147.2 25.6 1,723 14.9 29
1998 2.5 28 87.6 18.3 1,493 12.3 12
1999 1.6 34 46.0 17.6 1,923 9.2 8
2000 2.9 31 92.8 20.7 2,155 9.6 12
2001 7.0 77 90.9 12.1 1,796 6.8 37
2002 11.0 108 101.7 15.8 2,315 6.8 41
Source: IDA (2002a,b, 2003)6
In 2002, IPOs by income trusts represented four of the ﬁve largest Canadian IPOs in 2002 (Table
4).6 Although the income trust market was very hot in 2002, the market showed signs of slowing
towards the end of that year, with a number of IPOs being pulled or postponed due to a lack of
demand and a general repricing of the sector. The new supply of income trusts, which exceeded
$2 billion per quarter from late 2001, appears to have exceeded demand. Investors— particularly
institutional buyers of income trusts—backed away from the IPO market, and only three income
trust IPOs were completed in December. Over the fourth quarter of 2002, the BMO Nesbitt Burns
Trust Composite actually suffered a loss of -0.2 per cent, whereas the S&P/TSX Composite
posted a total return of 7.5 per cent.
6. “Income Trusts Power Canadian IPO Market to Record Levels in2002,” press release by
Pricewaterhouse Coopers, 7 January 2003.
Table 4: Largest Initial Public Offerings of 2002
Offerings Value $mn Gross underwriters’ fees
SFK Pulp Fund 414.8 $22.8 mn / 5.50%
TSX Group Inc. 341.6 $17.1 mn / 5.00%
Bell Nordiq Income Fund 324.4 $17.0 mn / 5.25%
InnVest Real Estate Investment Trust 300.0 $16.5 mn / 5.50%
Boralex Power Income Fund 250.0 $13.1 mn / 5.25%
Source: PricewaterhouseCoopers, SEDAR ﬁlings7
A signiﬁcant development in the income trust market in 2002 was the sale of U.S.-based assets
through a Canadian income trust. Heating Oil Partners Income Fund was the ﬁrst Canadian
income trust to be created using U.S. operating assets, but six other U.S. businesses had ﬁled
prospectuses for similar transactions by the end of 2002. In March 2003, Specialty Foods Income
Fund became the second income trust based on U.S. assets to be issued in Canada. The issuance
of a Canadian income trust by a U.S. company has led the ﬁnancial media to question the
valuation of the income trust market.7 If American companies ﬁnd it more attractive to sell their
businesses in Canada than in the larger U.S. capital markets, observers are led to conclude that the
income trust market in Canada must present a unique ﬁnancing opportunity for businesses.
Commissions from income trust IPOs in 2002 were a principal source of income for investment
dealers in a year when industry proﬁts across all major business lines fell (IDA 2002b). While
full-year totals are not yet available, as of the third quarter 2002 income trust IPOs were
sustaining investment banking revenues, which were the main driver of investment dealer proﬁts.
The gross underwriters fee on an income trust IPO is 5 to 6 per cent, which suggests that gross
revenues from underwriting $5.1 billion in IPOs were up to $300 million (Table 4). The gross fees
on offerings by existing income trusts are likely to have added another $150 million. In
comparison, the total net proﬁts for the securities industry in 2001 were $1.01 billion (IDA
2002b). Table 5 shows the lead underwriters of income trust issues in 2002. Income trust IPOs
were also a major source of income for corporate law ﬁrms. Legal fees for issuers’ counsel on a
trust commonly range from $500,000 to $1 million or more, with fees for underwriter’s counsel
generally being about one-half to two-thirds of that amount.8
7. U.S. laws restrict the businesses that may qualify for special tax treatment to a few speciﬁc industries,
such as real estate and natural resources. Apart from REITs and master limited partnerships, the
United States does not have a security comparable to an income trustunit.
Table 5: Lead Underwriter of Income Trusts in 20021
Rank Underwriter Deals Gross proceeds ($ mn)
1 CIBC World Markets 31 2,967.9
2 Scotia Capital 20 2,011.2
3 RBC Capital Markets 19 1,987.0
4 BMO Nesbitt Burns 13 1,082.4
5 National Bank Financial 6 610.7
6 TD Securities 6 294.1
1. Full credit to lead underwriter.
Source: National Post, 27 January 2003
8. S.Rubin,“IncomeTrustOfferingsKeepLawyersHopping,”NationalPost,4February2003,p.DM2.8
3. Structure of an Income Trust
The structure of an income trust is designed to maximize the cash distributions from a set of
revenue-generating assets, with these distributions made on a periodic basis either monthly or
quarterly. Cash distributions are maximized because income trusts distribute all available earnings
to investors, whereas corporations distribute dividends on a discretionary basis. The cash
distributions from an income trust are maximized by minimizing or eliminating the corporate tax
paid by the operating company that holds these assets. Under the Income Tax Act, trusts are taxed
as individuals and are generally subject to the maximum personal income tax rate. In most
circumstances, however, income trusts can claim a deduction for the income distributed to the unit
holders, who are then liable to tax on that income according to their individual circumstances. In
other words, an income trust is a “ﬂow-through” vehicle that allows income to ﬂow through it and
be taxed at the investor level.
An income trust is typically established to hold all of the shares and a substantial amount of
interest-bearing debt of a particular corporation that, in turn, holds assets that have a reasonably
predictable revenue stream. The principal objective of the income trust structure is to reduce the
incidence of corporate taxation by creating a ﬂow of interest that is deductible by the corporation,
and which then “ﬂows through” the trust to be taxed as received by investors. The primary tax
advantage of this structure is the elimination of unintegrated corporate-level income tax.9 The
precise structure of any given income trust is determined by the nature of the assets, the tax
position of the company that sells the assets to the income trust, and an assessment of the most
tax-efﬁcient way to transfer the cash ﬂows to investors.
3.1 Corporate structure
Figure 4 shows a typical corporate structure. The corporation is capitalized with equity and debt,
which represent the two principal claims on the income of the corporation. Shareholders invest
equity in the company in return for dividends and the potential for capital appreciation of the
shares. Dividends are paid out of after-tax income. Shareholders must pay tax on this dividend
income in the tax year in which it is received, unless this investment is held in a tax-deferred
investment vehicle, such as an RRSP. Likewise, shareholders pay capital gains tax on the price
9. The Canadian tax system recognizes that dividends are distributed from after-tax income. Individuals
receive a dividend tax credit totake into account tax paid by the corporation under a mechanism
referred to as tax integration. The integration mechanism is based on the small-business income tax
rate; thus,credits may be smaller than the tax paid by the corporation. This situation is described as
under-integration, and commonly referred to as double taxation.9
appreciation of their shares over their cost base only when the shares are sold, allowing investors
to defer this tax for the future. Creditors provide debt ﬁnancing to the corporation in the form of
bank loans, trade credit, or ﬁxed-income securities issued through the capital markets. This
interest is paid out of pre-tax income. This debt can be secured against the assets of the
corporation, or the debt can represent an unsecured claim.
In a corporate structure, a group of full-time, professional managers run the company. These
managers are supervised by a board of directors, staffed by some combination of independent
directors and members of the management team, who supervise the management of the company
on behalf of shareholders. If the company is a reporting issuer or equivalent under applicable
securities legislation, it must ﬁle with the relevant securities regulatory authorities. These ﬁlings
outline the ﬁnancial statements, business, and corporate governance structure of the
corporation.10
3.2 Income trust structure
Figure 5 shows a typical income trust structure. The ﬁrst key difference is the introduction of one
or more legal entities between equity investors and the operating company. In this example, there
is one legal entity—the income trust—between equity investors and the operating company.
Equity investors in an income trust structure are called unitholders, because they buy units in the
income trust. The income trust, in turn, can own up to 100 per cent of the equity of the operating
company that holds the revenue-generating assets.
10. Documents ﬁled by reporting issuers on Canadian securities exchanges are available at http://
www.sedar.com.10
Almost all of the cash ﬂow generated by the operating company is distributed to unitholders in the
form of interest income, dividend payments, and a return of equity. These cash distributions are
made on a monthly or a quarterly basis. Interest payments are paid out of pre-tax income, and
dividends are paid out of after-tax income. The income trust uses a mix of debt and equity to
minimize the taxable income of the operating company. As Hayward (2002, 1531) states,
Byinterposingamutualfundtrustbetweenthepublicinvestorsandtheoperatingcorporation,
the corporation may substantially reduce or eliminate corporate tax at the operating entity
level and pass on those savings in the form of higher distributions to investors.
The equity that is treated as debt by the income trust is non-arm’s-length, private-market debt that
pays a coupon determined by the operating company’s management. Although this debt is
covered by a debt indenture, the debt generally does not carry the covenants or protection of a
public market debt issue (Fournier 2002). It is subordinated to other claims on the operating
company and should be viewed as equity for all purposes except for tax purposes.
The debt held by the income trust is distinct from the third-party, arm’s-length debt issued by the
operating company. Third-party creditors that lend to an operating company owned by an income
trust are in the same position as creditors to a corporation. Interest payments on bank loans or
ﬁxed-income debt are paid out of pre-tax income. This debt pays a market rate of interest, and has
the same covenants as other bank loans and public market issues. Most importantly, the third-
party debt issued by the operating company has a superior claim on the assets of the operating
company. When calculating the leverage of the operating company, however, only the third-party
debt is considered, because the debt held by the income trust is treated as equity.11
A second key difference between an income trust structure and a corporation is the structure of
corporate governance. The board of directors is replaced by a trustee (or board of trustees), who
supervises the operating company on behalf of unitholders. The management of the operating
company may be outsourced to a management company, or may be run internally by full-time,
professional management. Some income trusts also have a board of directors. The trustee is
appointed when the trust is created to act as a ﬁduciary on behalf of the unitholders of the trust,
and this relationship is governed by a trust indenture. The trustee oversees cash distributions to
unitholders in the income trust, and makes decisions related to the operating company on behalf
of unitholders. In practice, the trustee delegates many of these responsibilities to the management
of the operating company.
4. Valuation of an Income Trust
The valuation of an income trust is similar to the valuation of any other security. Investors
discount the future stream of cash ﬂows that are expected to accrue to unitholders using a discount
rate that reﬂects the uncertainty of the business and the capital structure. Three steps are
fundamental to the valuation of an income trust: an analysis of the distributable cash, an
understanding of the capital structure, and a comparison of the income trust against other income
trusts in the same industry sector or business. Existing income trusts should be valued relative to
their peers in the same industry using multiples of cash ﬂow that take into account the leverage in
the capital structure, the uncertainty of the business, and the type of cash distributed from a tax
perspective.
4.1 Distributable cash
The ﬁrst step in valuing an income trust is to understand how much cash will be distributed to
unitholders. Similar to the valuation of equity, cash distributions to unitholders are estimated
using earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) as a starting
point.11 EBITDA is used widely in valuation because it represents the cash from the operation of
the business, excluding cash raised through ﬁnancing and investment. EBITDA is also the cash
ﬂow available to pay creditors and equity-holders of a ﬁrm, without taking into account the capital
structure of the ﬁrm. An investor interested in a given income trust will analyze the business and
11. Investmenttextsoutlinemanydeﬁnitionsofcashﬂow,withdifferentmeasuresused,dependingonthe
objectives of the analysis; free cash ﬂow or economic value added (EVA) are two deﬁnitions among
many. Distributable cash is the benchmark for valuing an income trust.12
scrutinize the cash-ﬂow projections of management to determine whether the amounts are
reasonable and sustainable.
When forecasting distributable cash, EBITDA is adjusted for a number of cash expenses. The
most important are capital expenditures, actual interest expense, overhead and ﬁxed costs, and
actual taxes payable. Given that an income trust is expected to generate a steady stream of cash
ﬂows into the future, the assets must be maintained or replaced in the case of depleting assets,
such as oil reserves. Capital expenditures are expected to be modest for a mature business. Actual
interest expense is the amount of interest paid on third-party debt, which depends on the term and
amount of this debt. While actual taxes payable are expected to be small, some tax leakage may
occur. A number of income trusts in more volatile businesses incorporate a cash reserve, where
cash from one period is saved to smooth the ﬂow of cash distributions for the future. This practice
can provide comfort to unitholders, suggesting that management is conservative in its
assumptions. It can also send the opposite signal, however, by suggesting that future business
conditions are unpredictable and cash ﬂow may be volatile. Assumptions about the size of these
amounts will determine how much cash is left over to be distributed to unitholders.
Cash return is a popular measure of the attractiveness of an income trust, owing to its simplicity.
Cash return represents the amount of cash distributed to unitholders in the current period, divided
by the current price of one income trust unit. Cash return is comparable with dividend yield,
which measures the dividends paid out to common shareholders divided by the current price of a
common share. This ratio is simple but it can also be misleading. Like a dividend yield, cash
return is a backward-looking measure that considers one period of cash ﬂow relative to the unit
price at one point in time. Both dividends paid to common shareholders and distributable cash
paid to unitholders are expected to be stable over time, with management resisting a reduction in
payouts due to the negative signal such a decision would send to investors. However, the amount
of cash distributed per unit in the past may not be a good predictor of future distributions, if the
revenues of the operating company decline or assumptions about cash expenses are too optimistic.
In some cases, income trusts have overdistributed cash to maintain cash returns from a falling
income stream. This practice may prevent a fall in cash distributions in the short run, but will
surely lead to a fall in distributions in the future, because the operating entity is not sustainable
when run in this manner. Cash return should therefore not be equated with a bond yield, since the
coupon payment on a bond is generally ﬁxed, whereas cash distributions to unitholders are not.
A second point to consider is that the distributable cash paid to unitholders can take the form of
interest, dividends, or a return of equity. Return of equity should not be confused with return on
equity, a ratio that measures the proﬁtability of a business. With a return of equity, the operating
company repays unitholders part of their initial investment. In other words, unitholders get back13
some of their own money. This return of equity to unitholders reduces the cost base of their units,
with capital gains tax paid on any capital appreciation only when the units are sold. Two income
trusts may be generating the same cash returns; one of these, however, may be simply paying out
part of the investor’s equity, rather than generating cash distributions through operation of the
business. Investors should be sure they understand the source of cash distributions, rather than
rely simply on cash returns.
Individual investors need to consider after-tax returns when comparing investments, not pre-tax
returns. Apart from allowing investors to delay the payment of capital gains on part of their cash
distributions, income trusts do not offer more tax beneﬁts to investors than equities. Dividend and
interest income is subject to personal income tax, although unitholders may hold their investment
in a tax-sheltered savings plan, such as an RRSP. For investors who are subject to taxes, however,
it is important to understand what portion of the cash distribution in a given year is sheltered from
tax.
4.2 Capital structure
The second step in valuing an income trust is to understand the capital structure of the operating
company. Enterprise value refers to the market value of the debt and equity in a company. It is a
measure of the market value of the total assets of the business. When an income trust is being
established, enterprise value represents the total amount paid to the company that sells the
operating assets (the vendor) to the income trusts. The vendor of the assets is paid the proceeds of
the equity offering by the income trust and the proceeds of any debt that is assumed by the
operating company.12 The amount of equity raised through the IPO of the income trust depends
on the distributable cash generated by the assets and the cash return investors require to invest in
the income trust. The operating company generally assumes third-party debt as part of the sale.
Typically, this third-party debt is bank debt that is secured against the operating assets.
The amount of third-party debt in the capital structure of the operating company affects the
leverage of the operating company and the uncertainty of cash-ﬂow projections. Unitholders are
paid out of cash ﬂow after interest expense on third-party debt has been deducted. The actual
interest expense will therefore vary over time, and will directly affect the amount of distributable
cash. One multiple to use when comparing the leverage across income trusts is the dollar amount
of debt divided by the EBITDA generated by the assets. A typical income trust holds debt equal to
12. Although,intheory,theenterprisevalueisbasedonmarketvalue,inpracticeitisdifﬁculttoestablish
the market value of debt, sothe book value isused instead. Note that the value of total assets recorded
on a balance sheet is the book value of the debt and equity.14
0.5 to 1.5 times EBITDA (Scotia Capital 2002). Given that EBITDA is not the cash ﬂow that is
paid out to unitholders, it makes sense to consider the level of debt relative to distributable cash.
4.3 Industry
When considering an investment in an income trust, investors should not simply compare the cash
returns available across all categories of income trusts. To identify relative value, income trusts
should be compared with their peers in the same sector on the basis of a range of valuation
measures. Cash returns will vary across sectors in line with the relative risk of each business
model, the competitive environment, the characteristics of the assets being securitized, and the
capital structure decisions of management. Riskier business models should offer higher cash
returns within a given industry and across industries. A preferred measure would be to compare
the risk-adjusted returns of income trusts both within and across industries, although this measure
is not made available in research reports issued by the securities industry.
Table 6 shows typical valuation statistics for three distinct categories of income trusts. At one end
of the scale, power generation and pipeline trusts offer cash returns of 9 to 11 per cent, with these
businesses commanding a premium valuation based on multiples of cash ﬂow due to their
stability. In contrast, the average oil and gas royalty trust offers a cash return of 20 per cent or
more, in line with the uncertainty of a business that is based on a depleting asset with volatile
market prices for its products. Diversiﬁed businesses lie between these two extremes, offering
cash returns of 8 to 12 per cent that reﬂect the uncertainty of their business models and the
relatively higher leverage in their capital structure.
Source: BMO Nesbitt Burns (2003)






Pre-tax cash return 9.5% 21.4% 11.1%
Per cent tax deferred 61% 45% 19%
Price-to-cash ﬂow 11.9x 4.6x 8.3x
Debt-to-cash ﬂow 1.5x 1.1x 2.6x
Enterprise value-to-EBITDA 12.6x 5.8x 9.7x15
In summary, income trusts should be valued relative to other income trusts in the same industrial
sector, using multiples of cash ﬂow adjusted for leverage to determine relative value. Various
multiples should be used in this comparison, to capture the impact of capital structure decisions
among other factors.
4.4 Valuation example
Table 7 shows an example of how cash return and leverage interact in the valuation of an
operating company. In this example, assets generating $30 million in EBITDA are sold to an
operating company. The deductions from EBITDA to arrive at distributable cash are minimal,
with capital expenditure equivalent to 10 per cent of EBITDA estimated to maintain the operating
assets in perpetuity. Investors in this income trust expect to earn a cash return ranging from 11 per
cent in column A to 14 per cent in columns C, D, and E.
Source: Based on Scotia Capital (2002)
Table 7: Illustrative Pricing of $30 million EBITDA Company ($ millions)
AB C D E
1. Distributable cash
EBITDA 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0
Less:
Capital expenditure (10% of EBITDA) 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
   Interest expense (6% coupon) 2.7 2.7 2.7 0.0 4.2
   Estimated ﬁxed costs 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
   Estimated capital tax 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
Distributable cash 22.7 22.7 22.7 25.4 21.2
2. Enterprise value
Cash return (distributable cash/equity) 11.0% 12.5% 14.0% 14.0% 14.0%
Equity (size of income trust IPO) 206.4 181.6 162.1 181.4 151.4
Debt (third-party) 45.0 45.0 45.0 0 70
Enterprise value (sale price of assets) 251.4 226.6 207.1 181.4 221.4
3. Leverage
Enterprise value/ EBITDA 8.4 x 7.6 x 6.9 x 6.0 x 10.4
Debt/EBITDA 1.5 x 1.5 x 1.5 x 0.0 x 2.3 x
Debt/distributable cash 2.0 x 2.0 x 2.0 x 0.0 x 3.3 x16
The cash return demanded by unitholders determines the size of the income trust. Investors have
an incentive to buy the income trust that has the relatively highest cash return for a given level of
risk. The cash return determines how much equity will be raised through the income trust IPO.
The IPO size is determined by dividing the distributable cash by the cash return required by
investors. For example, operating company A has distributable cash of $22.7 million and offers a
cash return of 11 per cent, leading to an IPO size of $206 million. This approach treats the cash
ﬂow generated by the assets as a perpetuity, where the cash return is the discount rate used to
capitalize future expected cash distributions. If investors demand a higher cash return for a given
level of distributable cash, the proceeds from the IPO will fall, as column B of Table 7 shows,
where $22.7 million of distributable cash that generates a return of 12.5 per cent leads to equity of
$181.6 million.
The enterprise value of the operating company varies, based on the amount of third-party debt in
its capital structure. If it is assumed that the operating company issues debt equal to two times
EBITDA, then the level of debt is $45 million and the enterprise value of operating company A is
$251 million (or 8.4 times EBITDA). A higher cash return for a given level of debt leads to a
smaller amount of equity raised in an IPO and a smaller enterprise value. The same assets may be
sold to generate cash returns of 12.5 per cent in column B or 14 per cent in column C, which
reduces the amount of equity raised to $181 million and $162 million, respectively. With $45 million
of debt in the capital structure, the enterprise value is reduced to $227 million (or 7.6 times
EBITDA) in column B or $207 million (or 6.9 times EBITDA) in column C.
A higher level of debt for a given cash return leads to a smaller amount of equity raised in an IPO,
but a higher enterprise value. The operating companies in columns C, D, and E all provide the
same cash return of 14 per cent. However, the degree of leverage varies, from column D having no
leverage to column E having the highest. As leverage increases for a given cash return, the
distributable cash drops as the interest expense rises, leading to a smaller amount of equity.
Column E has the highest leverage but the least amount of equity; however, it provides a relatively
higher enterprise value, at $221 million, than columns C and D, and the highest multiple of
enterprise value to distributable cash ﬂow. The incentive of the vendor of the assets is to increase
the leverage for any given cash return demanded by investors, because leverage increases the total
proceeds received for the sale of the assets; namely, the enterprise value.
Table 7 shows how the incentives of the vendor and the underwriter can vary, with both parties
constrained by the demands of investors. The underwriter has an incentive to maximize the size of
the income trust IPO for a given cash return by minimizing the amount of debt held by the
operating company. The vendor, however, has an incentive to maximize the enterprise value of the
operating company by increasing the leverage, making the cash return more volatile. Clearly,
unitholders are best off in the column that has the highest cash return and the lowest leverage,17
aligning their incentives with the underwriters of the IPO. Investors should therefore consider the
risk-adjusted cash return when comparing income trusts with different amounts of leverage, to
ensure that they are being paid for the greater volatility inherent in the capital structure. For the
diversiﬁed-business income trusts followed by BMO Nesbitt Burns, the levels of debt for 2001
ranged from a low of 1.7 times distributable cash to a high of 4.4 times, with a mean of 2.6 times.
This valuation analysis has raised three pitfalls that investors should be aware of when comparing
the cash return on income trusts. First, income trust investors need to scrutinize the assumptions
about cash ﬂow, to ensure that the amount of distributable cash generated from a given level of
EBITDA is realistic and sustainable. Second, investors should understand what they are receiving
when they are paid a cash distribution. Because cash distributions represent a combination of
interest, dividends, and return of capital, identical cash distributions may reﬂect different
combinations of these returns. Part of the distribution may be a return of equity that allows tax to
be deferred but represents a return of the unitholder’s investment in the income trust, not earnings
generated by the operating company. This problem is particularly serious if the operating
company is overdistributing cash ﬂow and allowing the earning power of assets to decline. Third,
the cash return should be compared on a risk-adjusted basis, to incorporate differences in capital
structure across income trusts. Multiples of debt should be compared to understand the impact of
capital structure choices on the uncertainty of cash ﬂows. In particular, debt levels should be
compared with distributable cash and not with EBITDA.
5. Issues Related to Income Trusts
Income trusts can be considered from two perspectives. From that of a company, income trusts
present an opportunity to both raise capital and sell off assets, but they also represent a risk, due to
the presence of a potential tax-advantaged competitor in a given market sector. From an investor’s
perspective, the attractiveness of an income trust depends on a judgment of whether the cash
returns are appropriate given the risks of the investment. This section addresses a number of
issues related to the analysis of income trusts—both the beneﬁts and risks—to provide a
perspective on the role played by this asset class in Canada’s capital markets. This discussion
raises a number of issues that investors should be aware of when analyzing an income trust for
investment.
5.1 Beneﬁts of income trusts
The income trust market has delivered a number of beneﬁts. Firms have been able to realize
signiﬁcant gains on the sale of assets through this market. Companies have therefore been able to18
raise signiﬁcant amounts of capital by selling off mature assets and either returning the proceeds
to shareholders or investing them in potentially more proﬁtable growth opportunities. This means
of raising capital has particularly beneﬁted small ﬁrms or ﬁrms that did not have access to
Canadian equity markets on attractive terms. A number of companies, such as Big Rock
Breweries of Alberta, chose to delist from stock exchanges, because it was more attractive for
investors to operate the business through an income trust structure, owing to the reduction of
corporate tax.
Investors have earned high cash returns from income trusts over the past few years, a period when
Canadian stock markets suffered signiﬁcant losses and interest rates declined to historically low
levels. Apart from the immediate appeal of high cash returns, this type of investment suits
investors who prefer to have management distribute cash from the business, rather than leave the
cash in the hands of managers who may reinvest the funds unwisely. Higher cash payouts reduce
the need to monitor management. This beneﬁt took on special meaning in the wake of the
corporate governance scandals of the past few years.
The income trust sector has also been an important source of revenues for the securities industry.
It has replaced the earnings lost by the fall in mergers and acquisitions activity and the drop in
traditional equity offerings (IDA 2002b).
5.2 Issues raised by income trusts
Although the growth of this market sector has numerous beneﬁts, it also has a number of potential
issues that investors should consider when valuing an income trust. Table 8 classiﬁes these issues
into four broad categories: legal and regulatory, corporate governance, operational, and market.
Legal and regulatory issues include the potential personal liability of unitholders, the possibility
of a change in tax treatment, and the treatment of unitholders in the event of bankruptcy.
Corporate governance issues focus on the role and appointment of trustees and the management
company, potential conﬂicts of interest, unclear incentives, and the limited legal rights of
unitholders. Operational issues are related to the subordination of the unitholder’s claim on the
operating assets, the sustainability of expected cash ﬂows from these assets, and the degree of
leverage in the operating company’s capital structure. Market issues concern the sensitivity of
income trust valuations to changes in the level of interest rates, the level of risk premiums
premiums, secondary market liquidity, and future access by an income trust to the capital markets.
Each issue is addressed in turn.19
5.3 Legal and regulatory issues
5.3.1 Potential liability of income trust unitholders13
Unitholders may be personally liable for the debts or actions of the operating company. Unlike
corporate law, trust law may not provide unitholders with limited liability. Although this is legally
feasible, a number of Canadian securities ﬁrms have given legal opinions that there is little
probability of this type of event occurring. Even if this possibility is seen as remote, a large group
of institutional investors are unwilling to purchase income trusts until the limited liability issue is
resolved. On 12 November 2002, it was reported that income trusts would not be included in the
S&P/TSX Composite Index any time soon, the view being that the major concern was the
unresolved issue of possible unlimited liability of unitholders of trusts.14 The chief executive
ofﬁcer of Canada’s largest real estate investment trust was quoted as saying that various U.S.
institutions will continue to refuse to purchase units of Canadian real estate investment trusts until
the limited liability issue is resolved. In October 2002, it was also reported that the Government of
Table 8: Summary of Issues in Income Trusts
Category Issues
Legal and regulatory issues Personal liability of unitholders
Tax treatment
Bankruptcy
Corporate governance issues Related to trustees
Related to management company
Rights of unitholders
Operational issues Subordination of claim by unitholders
Cash-ﬂow sustainability
Financial leverage
Market issues Level of interest rates
Risk premiums
Future access to ﬁnancing
Secondary-market liquidity
13. Most of the detail in this section comes from Erlichman (2002), Senior Partner of Fasken Martineau
DuMoulin LLP.
14. Pension funds argued that the S&P/TSX Composite must be an investable index. Pension funds,
however, are unable topurchase income trusts, owing to the potential liability. See T. Slee, “TSX
Committee Ignoresthe Real World,” 12 December 2002, available at http://www.gordonpape.com.20
Alberta had been approached by interested parties to have legislation adopted in that jurisdiction
to put the liability issue to rest for business trusts formed under Alberta law.15 The Ontario
Teachers Pension Plan Board launched a new subsidiary in early 2003, called Golden Apple, to
invest in income trusts, to shelter the pension fund from potential liabilities.16
Erlichman (2002) states that:
By statute and common law, a corporation is a legal entity and the shareholders (in their
capacity as shareholders) have the beneﬁt of limited liability subject to certain exceptions. . . .
Under the law relating to trusts, if a creditor has not agreed pursuant to an exculpatory clause
in a contract that the creditor’s claims will be satisﬁed out of the trust property only, the trus-
tee may be personally liable to the creditor. If there are insufﬁcient trust assets from which the
trustee can be indemniﬁed, the question then becomes whether the trustee in turn has the right
to be indemniﬁed by the unitholders. It has been held in cases involving private trusts that
competent beneﬁciaries may be obligated to indemnify a trustee against liabilities properly
incurred by the trustee. That principle also may apply to public income trusts, although there
have been no reported cases to my knowledge, which deal with this issue in a public trust con-
text. An important caveat, however, is that the private trust cases also indicate that any right of
indemnity against beneﬁciaries that a trustee would otherwise have may be excluded by the
terms of the instrument creating the trust. Accordingly, if properly drafted, a trust instrument
can insulate beneﬁciaries from personal liability based upon the rationale of this line of cases.
Erlichman concludes that “most Canadian lawyers who have thought about this issue believe there
is but a remote chance that liability would accrue to unitholders of a Canadian mutual fund trust
(which for the purposes of this legal issue is no different from an income trust) if there were
insufﬁcient assets in the trust itself from which the trustee could satisfy a liability to creditors of
the trust.”
The issue of unitholder liability is being addressed in Ontario. Finance Minister Janet Ecker
announced in the Ontario Budget Speech on 27 March that the Government of Ontario would
limit the liability on trusts governed by the laws of Ontario under a proposed Trust Beneﬁciaries’
Liability Act 2003.17 The Act states that (Ontario 2003):
The beneﬁciaries of a trust are not, as beneﬁciaries, liable for any act, default, obligation or
liability of the trust or any of its trustees if, when the act or default occurs or the obligation or
liability arises,
(a) the trust is a reporting issuer under the Securities Act; and
(b) the trust is governed by the laws of Ontario.
15. Arc Energy is lobbying the Government of Albertato enact laws that would provide trust unitholders
withlimitedliability.See“TrustsShutOutofTSXBenchmark,”NationalPost,11November2002,p.
FP1.
16. A. Willis, “Teachers’ Golden Apple Move Lends Polish to Income Trusts,”The Globe and Mail,2 4
January 2003, p. B10.
17. E. Roseman, “Income Trust Holders to Get Liability Shield,”The Toronto Star,p .C 3 .21
The passage of this Act is expected to lead to the introduction of similar legislation in Alberta,
where similar lobbying efforts have been underway for some time. Given that most income trusts
are located in Ontario and Alberta, these efforts are likely to reduce the potential risk of unitholder
liability. CIBC reports, however, that the S&P/TSX will likely reconsider the inclusion of income
trusts into the general composite index once the liability risk is eliminated from all income trusts
established in all provinces.18
5.3.2 Tax treatment
Several industry analysts suggest that the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency (CCRA) could
change the current tax structure to eliminate the favourable tax treatment given to income trusts
(CIBC World Markets 2003; TD Newcrest 2002). Although the growth of the income trust sector
has likely affected corporate tax revenues, it is hard to estimate how much the tax burden has
changed.19
Hayward (2002) provides a comprehensive review of the tax issues. Essentially, the operating
company reduces its taxable income by making interest payments to unitholders on a high-yield
note that is issued by the operating company and held by the income trust. Although the interest
rate on this note is set to reduce taxable income to near-zero, it must nonetheless meet the criteria
of reasonableness under paragraph 20(1)(c) of the Income Tax Act (Canada). The coupon on this
debt and the degree of leverage in the capital structure are chosen to minimize corporate tax at the
operating company level. As a result, the income that is distributed to unitholders is effectively
taxed only once, either when it is received by unitholders in the form of dividends or interest
payments, or when they sell their units in the case of returns of capital. Hayward (2002, 1560)
argues that an income trust structure “highlights a serious ﬂaw in the system—namely, the failure
to apply a coherent and consistent treatment to legal entities, economic claims, and cash ﬂows that
may differ in form but that are equivalent in substance.” The courts are unlikely to interfere in this
area, however, because past precedents show that the courts respect the legal form of the
transaction without regard to the underlying economic purpose.
5.3.3 Bankruptcy
Insofar as income trusts are not accumulating retained earnings, they are ﬁnancially dependent on
the capital markets to provide capital. This dependence renders income trusts vulnerable,
particularly in the event of an economic downturn in their respective sectors (Erlichman 2002).
The question arises as to how a ﬁnancially distressed income trust would achieve ﬁnancial
18. A.S. Dunning, “Income Trust Inclusion into the S&P/TSX Composite Index,” CIBC World Markets,
10 April 2003.
19. S. Rubin, “Ottawa Faces $1B inLost Tax,”National Post, 15 August 2002, pp. FP1, FP8.22
restructuring, given the existing state of Canadian insolvency legislation. Because of the legal
status of an income trust, Erlichman (2002) argues that existing bankruptcy law would not apply.
Instead, existing trust law would have to be modiﬁed for this event, complicating this process and
increasing the costs.
5.4 Corporate governance issues
The Trust Indenture and the Management Agreement outline the duties of trustees and the
management company, respectively, but leave most of the decisions to the managers. This
situation raises questions about the corporate governance of an income trust, particularly related
to the stafﬁng of these positions, their incentives, and the level of disclosure of any conﬂicts of
interest. By extension, these documents and the powers that they confer on Trustees and the
management company impact the rights of unitholders. This situation appears to be the inevitable
outcome of adopting a legal form that was not intended for this purpose. The attractive valuation
of income trusts explains why owners of businesses have adopted income trusts as a substitute for
a corporate form. While income trusts resemble corporate entities, they fall under a different code
of law with different requirements for corporate governance. Trusts were not designed to
accommodate active shareholder input, leading to a deﬁciency in the disclosure and transparency
of income trusts relative to corporate entities (Erlichman 2002). These issues are explored below.
5.4.1 Trustees
According to Erlichman (2002), there is no legislation enforced in Canada that requires trustees of
an income trust to be independent, or that requires a majority of the trustees to be independent.
Both the Ontario Securities Commission and the B.C. Securities Commission have made
proposals that describe a framework for regulating mutual funds and their managers. In many
cases, the trustees may be appointed without the approval of unitholders, are responsible for
drafting disclosure and insider trading policies, and are responsible for auditing the management
of the operating company. More importantly, in the case of many income trusts, some or all of the
trustees of the income trust are the managers of the operating company. This situation creates a
number of potential conﬂicts of interest that investors must take into account when they evaluate
an income trust. In addition, the trustees may be individually indemniﬁed by the income trust in
respect to the discharge of their duties, or they may delegate many of their responsibilities to
management to avoid potential liability (Fournier 2002).23
5.4.2 Management of the operating company
Although the corporate trustee makes the actual distributions of cash to unitholders of the income
trust, the trustee typically delegates most, if not all, of his or her responsibilities and powers to the
management company. This management company manages the operating company and its
assets, and the administrative functions of the income trust itself. The management company is
also generally responsible for pursuing investments or acquisitions to maintain or increase the
levels of cash ﬂow generated by the operating company. These cash-generating assets need to be
preserved to maintain a steady distribution of cash to unitholders in the income trust.
Historically, the management company appointed to run the operating company has consisted of
the promoters or organizers (i.e., past management) of the income trust. Investors need to be
aware of a possible conﬂict of interest, where the management fees and incentives may not align
the interests of the managing company with the interests of the unitholders. For example, a
shareholder of the management company who is not an ofﬁcer or board member of the trust does
not technically have to disclose trading in the units of the trust (TD Newcrest 2002). Also,
although the total dollar amount of compensation of the management company is disclosed, the
trust does not have to disclose individual compensation. The management company usually has
the right to appoint a certain proportion of board members without input from unitholders (TD
Newcrest 2002). In addition, the management company does not necessarily have to devote all of
its time to running the trust, but may be engaged in other business activities that are not disclosed.
These examples highlight only a few of the potential areas of conﬂict that can exist between
unitholders and the management company.
5.4.3 Rights of unitholders
Unlike a shareholder in a company, a unitholder in an income trust does not have the right to bring
“oppressive or derivative actions” against the trustees or the management company (TD Newcrest
2002). This type of action is used by minority equity shareholders to argue against actions by
management that may be against the interests of minority shareholders. While the courts can
intercede to remedy the situation on behalf of a shareholder, they would not have the same ability
in the case of a trust.
5.5 Operational issues
5.5.1 Cash-ﬂow sustainability
Not every business model is viable as an income trust. This structure is most suitable for
businesses that generate a steady stream of cash distributions, require minimal capital expenditure24
and face limited competition. It is not suitable for growth businesses, businesses requiring
individual expertise, businesses with intangible assets, or businesses that require large ongoing
capital expenditures. Given the proliferation of income trusts in different business sectors,
commentators question whether the cash-ﬂow assumptions that support IPO valuations are
sustainable in the long run.
There are two main issues regarding cash-ﬂow sustainability. First, the capital expenditure
assumed in valuing the income trust may not be sufﬁcient to sustain the cash ﬂow that is to be
distributed to unitholders. If the assets held by the operating company depreciate or amortize
more quickly than anticipated, the operating company may need to make capital expenditures to
maintain the stock, or must acquire new assets to maintain the viability of the income trust. This
activity would reduce distributable cash ﬂow, thereby reducing the cash return of the units. Such a
case occurred in 1999, when Luscar Coal cut its distribution.20 In other cases, income trusts have
been found to be overdistributing cash ﬂow to investors. In effect, the income trust distributes
more than 100 per cent of earnings to unitholders, in an effort to avoid cutting the cash
distribution. This type of activity would only delay the inevitable decline in cash distributions.
A second issue, highlighted in section 4.4, is the degree of leverage in the capital structure of the
operating company. Higher leverage may increase the cash return to the unitholders, but it reduces
the risk-adjusted return. If the coupon on the third-party debt is variable, or if the term to maturity
of this debt is short, investors need to be aware that the actual interest expense may rise when the
coupon resets or the debt is reﬁnanced. An increase in this interest expense will directly reduce
the distributable cash. This interest expense should not be confused with the interest expense on
the subordinated debt held by the income trust, which is not subject to market ﬂuctuations and is
controlled to some extent by the operating company.
These issues led Standard & Poor’s to introduce a new product in 1999 called stability ratings.
These ratings are intended to reﬂect the “sustainability and variability in distributable cash ﬂow
generation in the medium to long term” (S&P 2002).21 An S&P stability rating is relative to other
income funds, and ranges from a high rating of SR-1 to a low of SR-7. An income fund rated SR-
1 has the highest level of cash distribution stability and the lowest level of expected variability
relative to other rated Canadian income funds. The stability rating is based on an assessment of
four factors: an analysis of the fund’s structure and governance, an evaluation of the fund’s
20. “Forget Bubble Talk about IncomeTrusts,”The Globe and Mail, 14 December2002, p. C1.
21. Income-fund stability ratings are distinct from bond credit ratings. The stability rating addresses the
variabilityandsustainabilityofthecashﬂowsthatremainafteralldebtobligationshavebeenserviced.
A credit rating reﬂects the ability and willingness of a borrowerto make interest and principal
payments on a speciﬁc debt issue.25
business proﬁle (broken down into operational stability, market position, and asset quality), an
analysis of the fund’s ﬁnancial proﬁle (broken down into capital structure, cash-ﬂow analysis, and
other factors), and an analysis of the fund’s distribution analysis. A stability rating is voluntary,
and income trusts must pay Standard & Poor’s to receive one. As of year-end 2002, only 25
income trusts were rated. Standard & Poor’s suggests that a large number of income trusts may
have chosen not to seek a stability rating because it could have reﬂected negatively on their
valuation (S&P 2002). The extent to which stability ratings are factored into the valuation of an
income trust is unclear. Presumably, if this product is valued by the marketplace, unrated income
trusts will eventually be forced to seek a stability rating in response to market pressure, or be
penalized for a lack of disclosure relative to rated income trusts.
5.5.2 Financial leverage
Income trusts are like corporate entities. The management of the operating company chooses the
amount of debt to include in the capital structure based on the underlying business and its capital
intensity. However, section 4.4 has highlighted the fact that the incentives for the vendor of the
assets are to increase the amount of debt at the operating-company level, leading to varying levels
of leverage for competing income trusts in the same industry (Tables 6 and 7). The amount of
leverage, measured as the third-party debt-to-cash ﬂow, affects the uncertainty of the business.
Higher leverage leads to greater subordination of the unitholder’s claim on the operating assets,
greater sensitivity to changes in interest rates, and more variable cash ﬂow. These effects are
implicit in the use of debt-to-cash ﬂow multiples, and are taken into account by Standard & Poor’s
stability ratings. A simple measure, such as price-to-cash ﬂow, does not reveal anything about
leverage directly, in much the same way that the price-to-earnings multiple for a corporation does
not reveal the capital structure of an investment in a common share. Investors need, therefore, to
consider a range of valuation measures that explicitly take leverage into account. The discount
rate used to capitalize future cash ﬂows should be higher for a leveraged income trust, leading to a
lower price for the same stream of cash distributions.
5.5.3 Subordination of claim by unitholders
One of the deﬁning features of an income trust structure is for the trust to hold a signiﬁcant
amount of unsecured, subordinated debt issued by the operating company. This subordinated debt
carries a high interest rate that reduces the taxable income of the operating company. Typically,
this subordinated debt has a long maturity to defer repayment of the principal on this debt to
unitholders.
Lenders to the income trust sector are in the same position as lenders to other businesses. A bank
loan or third-party debt issued at the operating-company level is secured by the assets of the26
operating company. These assets provide collateral in the event of bankruptcy. Thus, bank or
third-party debt held at the operating-company level has a superior claim to the assets of the
operating company than the subordinated debt held by unitholders in the income trust. Any losses
that exceed the value of these debts would represent a writedown of the income trust’s equity in
the business, reducing the value of the units held by income trust unitholders. For this reason,
analysts view this subordinated debt as quasi-equity.
Standard & Poor’s has compared the risk on income trust units to high-yield bonds, stating “in
terms of relative risk, [an income trust unit is] subordinate to, and therefore riskier than, its high-
yield cousin.”22According to Fournier (2002), the subordinated debt cannot be guaranteed by the
operating company or a third party, because any guarantee on debt owned by the income trust may
impair the ability of the income trust to qualify as a “mutual fund trust” under the Income Tax Act
(Canada). If the operating company runs into cash-ﬂow difﬁculties, creditors may have the power
through bond covenants to suspend cash distributions to the unitholders of the income trust.
5.6 Financial market issues
5.6.1 Level of interest rates
The principal factor impacting the unit values of these income trusts is the level of long-term
interest rates. Income trusts are attractive because they offer a high cash return relative to other
asset classes. Their growth throughout 2001 and 2002, therefore, is partly due to the historically
low level of interest rates, the underperformance of the overall equity markets over that period,
and the subsequent low cash returns on other asset classes. Income trusts, like other asset classes
that compete on the basis of yield, are sensitive to the level of interest rates because they promise
a steady cash payment into the future that is discounted to the present, similar to a perpetuity.
The high cash ﬂows paid to unitholders and generated by the operating assets are expected to be
maintained in perpetuity, as discussed in section 5.5.1. Given the projected stability of cash ﬂows,
income trust units are often compared erroneously with ﬁxed-income instruments. Unlike a bond,
an income trust does not pay back principal at a ﬁxed point in the future, although unitholders
may get back some of their investment in the form of a return of capital. One similarity, however,
is the sensitivity to the level of interest rates, particularly long-term interest rates. Like a ﬁxed-
income instrument, the rate at which future cash ﬂows are capitalized is central to the valuation of
this security. A rise in the overall level of interest rates may therefore cause income trust
valuations to fall, because the future cash ﬂows are discounted at a higher rate.
22. Standard & Poor’s, “Report: Spotlight Shines on Canadian Income Trusts in 2002,” 7 January 2003,
and “Income Trusts: Canada’s High-Yield Market?” 7 January 2003.27
A rise in the level of interest rates may also have an indirect negative impact on income trust
valuations. If the third-party debt held by the operating company pays a variable rate of interest, a
rise in short-term interest rates would increase the interest expense and decrease the cash available
for distribution to investors. If cash distributions drop, income trust values must fall accordingly.
5.6.2 Risk premiums
In ﬁnance, the discount rate used to capitalize future cash ﬂows reﬂects the latter’s riskiness. The
uncertainty for a bondholder is measured by a credit rating and is reﬂected in the credit spread
over some risk-free benchmark with the same maturity. For equity holders, the riskiness of a
company depends on ﬁrm-level and industry characteristics and is captured by the covariance of
the ﬁrm’s stock returns with the market portfolio—the beta—which forms part of the cost of
equity.
Studies show that risk premiums are time-varying and reﬂect market conditions. If market
conditions change, investors may demand a higher return for a given level of risk. Unitholders in
an income trust are exposed to the same potential change in risk premiums. When market
conditions deteriorate, because of too much supply, higher volatility, lower liquidity, or an
increase in risk aversion, the risk premium charged on income trusts may rise. A reassessment of
the valuation of an income trust can have the same effect. A negative shock to the income trust
sector could cause a fall in income trust prices, as investors reassess the valuation of different
income trust business models and legal structures. In all of these cases, a rise in risk premiums
would cause future cash ﬂows to be discounted more heavily, leading to a fall in the valuation of
this security.
5.6.3 Future access to ﬁnancing
Income trusts may need to roll over third-party debt held at the operating-company level, or they
may wish to raise additional ﬁnancing to replace depleting or depreciating assets. If the assets of
the operating company are not maintained or replaced as needed, the cash ﬂow generated by them
will decline and with it the cash distributions to unitholders. Because income trusts do not retain
earnings, the only options for raising new capital are to issue more units or to borrow against
existing assets. Future access to ﬁnancing is therefore crucial for the income trust to remain
economically viable in the long run. However, future access to ﬁnancing is not guaranteed.
The operating companies owned by an income trust may secure funds through the bank-loan
market. This source of funds is limited, however, by the amount of existing debt relative to the
value of the assets held by the operating company. At some level of leverage, creditors will no28
longer be willing to lend to the operating company, at which time access to ﬁnancing through
equity markets becomes crucial. Alternatively, a downturn in the business of the operating
company that happens when the third-party debt is due to be rolled over may lead the creditors not
to roll over their loans, or to charge a signiﬁcantly higher rate of interest. In this case, the income
trust would have to turn to the equity markets for additional ﬁnancing at a time when the business
looks least attractive.
The equity capital markets represent an alternative source of funds. Over the past two years,
equity issuance by income trusts picked up rapidly, with an average of $2.7 billion of equity
issuance per quarter from the fourth quarter of 2001 to the third quarter of 2002 (Figure 3). This
supply proved to be too much for the market to absorb. Income trust prices fell in the fourth
quarter of 2002, and a number of income trust transactions were delayed or pulled. Only three
income trust offerings were completed in December. Thus, future access to funds through the
equity markets may be restricted, as in the fourth quarter of 2002. If both the loan markets and the
equity markets are unwilling to ﬁnance the roll-over of debt, or to fund the acquisition of new
cash-generating assets, this could force the liquidation of the business.
5.6.4 Secondary-market liquidity
The relatively small market capitalization of the average income trust introduces liquidity risk,
since a small ﬂoat makes it difﬁcult to acquire or sell units without impacting the price. A large
number of income trusts have a market capitalization of below $100 million, which is considered
to be relatively small. This issue has been partially addressed by creating funds of income trusts
that invest in a diversiﬁed portfolio of income funds. However, smaller-cap income trusts may
suffer more during volatile periods in the markets because of this reduced liquidity.
6. Closing Observations
This paper has provided an overview of the income trust market, its growth, and the total return of
this sector over the past two years. Companies have received attractive valuations for assets sold
through this vehicle, and investors have received a high total return in 2002 relative to the overall
stock market. This paper, however, highlights a number of issues related to income trusts that
investors should consider when making an investment. A better understanding of the issues raised
by income trusts will alleviate concerns about the valuation and rapid growth of this asset class.
The development of the income trust sector shows that Canadian capital markets are evolving to
meet the needs of companies and investors. Companies have successfully sold a wide variety of29
assets by transferring them into an income trust structure. This activity has encouraged the ﬂow of
investment capital to projects that have solid rates of return (Shenfeld 2003). Investors have been
offered a new investment vehicle that pays high cash returns. By returning cash ﬂows to investors,
income trusts allow investors to decide how best to allocate those funds, rather than leave them in
the hands of management. The ﬁnancial media have expressed concern about the rapid growth
and the valuation of this asset class, claiming that the high multiples paid for the assets by
unitholders are a sign of overvaluation. This concern is being addressed by the marketplace, as
investors become more knowledgeable about the beneﬁts and the uncertainty of different business
models and allocate their funds appropriately. The decline in this market over the fourth quarter of
2002 and the slow start to 2003 may suggest that this market is evolving and has reached a new
phase of consolidation with slower growth. The performance of this asset class over the coming
year will put this perception to the test.30
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